![\"Exercise](\"https:\/\/www.fresherslive.com\/assets-images\/current-affairs\/2019\/sep\/25\/exercise-malabar-2019-began-at-the-coast-of-sasebo.jpg\")
<\/p>\n
Context:<\/span>
\n\u2022 There is speculation in the media that New Delhi could soon invite Australia to join the Malabar naval exercises to be held later this year. Malabar is a trilateral naval exercise with Japan and the United States in the Bay of Bengal. It appears a green signal to Australia could soon be given, making it the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad will participate in a joint military drill, aimed ostensibly at China.<\/span><\/h3>\nPossible conflict point:<\/span><\/h3>\n\u2022 Beijing has long opposed a coalition of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.<\/p>\n
\u2022 The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China\u2019s rise.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Earlier last week, the Chinese communist party\u2019s mouthpiece, noted that at a time of strained bilateral ties with China,<\/p>\n
India\u2019s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Expectedly, Indian commentators welcomed the development, hailing it as a long overdue move.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain.<\/p>\n
\u2022 The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Yet, Indian decision-makers have reason to be cautious.<\/p>\n
\u2022 At a time when India and China are negotiating a truce on the border in Eastern Ladakh, New Delhi\u2019s invitation to Australia to participate in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing.<\/p>\n
\u2022 If China responded churlishly through aggressive posturing in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.<\/p>\n
The Prospect of modest gains:<\/span><\/h3>\n\u2022 Indian decision-makers should also reflect on the strategic rationale of the military-Quad.<\/p>\n
\u2022 U.S. and its Pacific partner\u2019s principal motivation in forming a maritime coalition is to implement a \u2018rules-based order\u2019 in the Indo-Pacific littorals<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\u2022 India\u2019s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 While India has acquired airborne surveillance assets from the U.S., the Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 With U.S. defence companies hesitant to part with proprietary technology \u2014 in particular, vital anti-submarine warfare tech \u2014 the pay-off for New Delhi, in exchange for signing up the \u2018military-quad\u2019, is modest.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Maritime watchers know cooperation with the U.S. and Japan without attendant benefits of strategic technology transfers will not improve the Indian Navy\u2019s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).<\/p>\n
\u2022 In operational terms also, it might be premature for Delhi to initiate multilateral engagement with Quad partners.<\/strong><\/p>\n\u2022 With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China in East Asia and Southeast Asia hotting up, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n
\u2022 The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Notably, neither Washington nor Tokyo believes China\u2019s threats in the Indian Ocean equal the challenges the PLAN poses in the Pacific.<\/p>\n
\u2022 While they may engage in the occasional naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal, the U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Australia, ironically, is the only one ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.<\/strong><\/p>\nChina has been cautious:<\/span><\/h3>\n\u2022 There is also the question of timing. A balancing coalition must come together when the nature and magnitude of the threat is wholly manifest.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Again, it is worth pointing out that despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the PLAN is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Chinese warships have not challenged Indian sovereignty in its territorial waters, or ventured close to Indian islands with malign intent.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Nor have PLAN assets impeded the passage of Indian merchantmen in the regional sea lanes and choke points.<\/p>\n
\u2022 To the contrary, the Chinese Navy has avoided any entanglement with Indian naval ships in the subcontinental littorals.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Sure, Chinese research and intelligence ship presence close to the Andaman Islands has relatively expanded, but Chinese maritime agencies have gone about their task cautiously, ensuring that operations do not cross the threshold of conflict with India.<\/p>\n
\u2022 This also means that the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Were the Indian Navy to combine with friendly forces in regional littorals, it would need to be ready for the consequences.
\nNeed for careful thought:<\/p>\n
\u2022 The sobering reality for New Delhi is that naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.<\/p>\n
\u2022 This is not to suggest that inviting Australia to join the Malabar is a bad idea.<\/p>\n
\u2022 It is simply to posit that New Delhi should not sign up to quadrilateral engagement without a cost-benefit exercise and commensurate gains in the strategic-operational realm.<\/p>\n
\u2022 What might appear politically sensible could be operationally imprudent.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
For more such notes, Articles, News & Views Join our Telegram Channel.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n
\u2022 Beijing has long opposed a coalition of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.<\/p>\n
\u2022 The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China\u2019s rise.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Earlier last week, the Chinese communist party\u2019s mouthpiece, noted that at a time of strained bilateral ties with China,<\/p>\n
India\u2019s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Expectedly, Indian commentators welcomed the development, hailing it as a long overdue move.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain.<\/p>\n
\u2022 The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Yet, Indian decision-makers have reason to be cautious.<\/p>\n
\u2022 At a time when India and China are negotiating a truce on the border in Eastern Ladakh, New Delhi\u2019s invitation to Australia to participate in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing.<\/p>\n
\u2022 If China responded churlishly through aggressive posturing in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.<\/p>\n
The Prospect of modest gains:<\/span><\/h3>\n\u2022 Indian decision-makers should also reflect on the strategic rationale of the military-Quad.<\/p>\n
\u2022 U.S. and its Pacific partner\u2019s principal motivation in forming a maritime coalition is to implement a \u2018rules-based order\u2019 in the Indo-Pacific littorals<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\u2022 India\u2019s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 While India has acquired airborne surveillance assets from the U.S., the Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 With U.S. defence companies hesitant to part with proprietary technology \u2014 in particular, vital anti-submarine warfare tech \u2014 the pay-off for New Delhi, in exchange for signing up the \u2018military-quad\u2019, is modest.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Maritime watchers know cooperation with the U.S. and Japan without attendant benefits of strategic technology transfers will not improve the Indian Navy\u2019s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).<\/p>\n
\u2022 In operational terms also, it might be premature for Delhi to initiate multilateral engagement with Quad partners.<\/strong><\/p>\n\u2022 With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China in East Asia and Southeast Asia hotting up, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n
\u2022 The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Notably, neither Washington nor Tokyo believes China\u2019s threats in the Indian Ocean equal the challenges the PLAN poses in the Pacific.<\/p>\n
\u2022 While they may engage in the occasional naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal, the U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Australia, ironically, is the only one ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.<\/strong><\/p>\nChina has been cautious:<\/span><\/h3>\n\u2022 There is also the question of timing. A balancing coalition must come together when the nature and magnitude of the threat is wholly manifest.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Again, it is worth pointing out that despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the PLAN is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Chinese warships have not challenged Indian sovereignty in its territorial waters, or ventured close to Indian islands with malign intent.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Nor have PLAN assets impeded the passage of Indian merchantmen in the regional sea lanes and choke points.<\/p>\n
\u2022 To the contrary, the Chinese Navy has avoided any entanglement with Indian naval ships in the subcontinental littorals.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Sure, Chinese research and intelligence ship presence close to the Andaman Islands has relatively expanded, but Chinese maritime agencies have gone about their task cautiously, ensuring that operations do not cross the threshold of conflict with India.<\/p>\n
\u2022 This also means that the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Were the Indian Navy to combine with friendly forces in regional littorals, it would need to be ready for the consequences.
\nNeed for careful thought:<\/p>\n
\u2022 The sobering reality for New Delhi is that naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.<\/p>\n
\u2022 This is not to suggest that inviting Australia to join the Malabar is a bad idea.<\/p>\n
\u2022 It is simply to posit that New Delhi should not sign up to quadrilateral engagement without a cost-benefit exercise and commensurate gains in the strategic-operational realm.<\/p>\n
\u2022 What might appear politically sensible could be operationally imprudent.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
For more such notes, Articles, News & Views Join our Telegram Channel.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n
\u2022 India\u2019s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 While India has acquired airborne surveillance assets from the U.S., the Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
\u2022 With U.S. defence companies hesitant to part with proprietary technology \u2014 in particular, vital anti-submarine warfare tech \u2014 the pay-off for New Delhi, in exchange for signing up the \u2018military-quad\u2019, is modest.<\/p>\n
\u2022 Maritime watchers know cooperation with the U.S. and Japan without attendant benefits of strategic technology transfers will not improve the Indian Navy\u2019s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).<\/p>\n
\u2022 In operational terms also, it might be premature for Delhi to initiate multilateral engagement with Quad partners.<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2022 With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China in East Asia and Southeast Asia hotting up, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n \u2022 The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.<\/p>\n \u2022 Notably, neither Washington nor Tokyo believes China\u2019s threats in the Indian Ocean equal the challenges the PLAN poses in the Pacific.<\/p>\n \u2022 While they may engage in the occasional naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal, the U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.<\/p>\n \u2022 Australia, ironically, is the only one ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2022 There is also the question of timing. A balancing coalition must come together when the nature and magnitude of the threat is wholly manifest.<\/p>\n \u2022 Again, it is worth pointing out that despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the PLAN is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.<\/p>\n \u2022 Chinese warships have not challenged Indian sovereignty in its territorial waters, or ventured close to Indian islands with malign intent.<\/p>\n \u2022 Nor have PLAN assets impeded the passage of Indian merchantmen in the regional sea lanes and choke points.<\/p>\n \u2022 To the contrary, the Chinese Navy has avoided any entanglement with Indian naval ships in the subcontinental littorals.<\/p>\n \u2022 Sure, Chinese research and intelligence ship presence close to the Andaman Islands has relatively expanded, but Chinese maritime agencies have gone about their task cautiously, ensuring that operations do not cross the threshold of conflict with India.<\/p>\n \u2022 This also means that the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.<\/p>\n \u2022 Were the Indian Navy to combine with friendly forces in regional littorals, it would need to be ready for the consequences. \u2022 The sobering reality for New Delhi is that naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n \u2022 Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.<\/p>\n \u2022 This is not to suggest that inviting Australia to join the Malabar is a bad idea.<\/p>\n \u2022 It is simply to posit that New Delhi should not sign up to quadrilateral engagement without a cost-benefit exercise and commensurate gains in the strategic-operational realm.<\/p>\n \u2022 What might appear politically sensible could be operationally imprudent.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n For more such notes, Articles, News & Views Join our Telegram Channel.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\nChina has been cautious:<\/span><\/h3>\n
\nNeed for careful thought:<\/p>\n