Current Affairs: mains

National Family Health Survey report on malnutrition in Odisha

Relevance: Mains: G.S paper II: Governance

Context

  • Odisha, which is one of the Empowered Action Group States, or eight socioeconomically backward States of India, has done remarkably well in health and nutrition outcomes over the past two decades. Its infant mortality rate has significantly declined.
    • Its under-five mortality rate almost halved in the National Family Health Survey (NFHS)-4 from NFHS-3.
    • It has seen a steep decline in stunting in children under five. Anaemia in children and pregnant women has also decreased since NFHS-3.
    • Antenatal care and institutional deliveries have shown good improvement. All these changes have been possible with financing, policy support, robust leadership, and innovations in delivery of services.

Nutritional interventions

  • Nutrition has a strong correlation to health, and is integral to growth and development. Timely nutritional interventions of breastfeeding, age-appropriate complementary feeding, Vitamin A supplementation, and full immunisation are effective in improving nutrition outcomes in children.
    • Odisha has performed better than other Empowered Action Group States in reducing undernutrition, and sets an example with its nutrition action plan calling for convergence with health, nutrition, and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) programmes.
    • Odisha has taken a decisive step of decentralising the procurement of supplementary nutrition under the Integrated Child Development Services programme.
    • This has led to fair access of services under the ICDS by all beneficiaries.
    • This is evident from the rise in utilisation of services under the ICDS as compared to a decade ago.
    • There has been a marked improvement in supplementary nutrition received by pregnant and lactating women in NFHS-4 compared to NFHS-3.

Major loopholes highlighted

  • However, despite progress in child and maternal indicators, Odisha continues to be plagued by a high level of malnutrition.
    • There is stark variability across districts in stunting ranging from as high as 47.5% in Subarnapur to a low of 15.3% in Cuttack.
    • Wasting is high in 25 out of 30 districts. Almost half of the under-five children from tribal communities in Odisha are underweight, and 46% are stunted.
    • The infant mortality rate among tribals is the fourth highest in Odisha, after Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh.
    • Supplementary food given under the ICDS programme has shown a significant increase.
    • However, data show that less of such food is given as children grow older.
    • There is also a decline is children receiving timely complementary feeding.
    • Less than 10% of children receive a minimum acceptable diet. This can be attributed to a possible lack of understanding and awareness about nutrition due to illiteracy.

Improving implementation

  • Another challenge for Odisha is in reaching out to remote and particularly vulnerable tribal groups.
    • This could be the reason why tribal women and children are lagging behind the national average on nutrition and health indicators.
    • It is essential to improve the implementation of schemes, and ensure last-mile delivery of nutrition services.
    • A part of the solution lies in setting up mini Anganwadi centres catering to far-flung tribal hamlets.
    • Raising awareness through community campaigns on the need for good nutrition would help improve utilisation of services by beneficiaries.
    • The International Food Policy Research Institute, in its research, called for inter-department engagements to accelerate the nutrition outcome in Odisha.
    • There is a need to improve sanitation, women’s education and underlying poverty, to be able to tackle undernutrition.

Conclusion

  • Underweight children should also be identified precisely so that the monitoring mechanism for improving service delivery can be strengthened.
    • The National Nutrition Mission sets an example with its inter-ministerial convergence and real-time monitoring mechanism for tracking each beneficiary and tackling malnutrition.

 

 

New dimensions of India – Sri Lanka Relations

Relevance: Mains: G.S paper II: International

Context

  • Even before the new president of Sri Lanka, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, was sworn in, the narrative about Colombo’s renewed “tilt” towards China and against India had taken root.
    • The headline misrepresents the complex power play involving Beijing, Delhi and Colombo.

Background

  • The Great Game in the Subcontinent is not limited to just India and China.
    • It is quite easy to forget the considerable interests and influence of many other powers in the region, including the US, European Union, Japan and Russia.
    • The exclusive focus on major power rivalry masks the agency of South Asian political elites and their capacity to manoeuvre among the major powers.

About Rajapaksas

  • Although the Rajapaksas had blamed India for their defeat in the 2015 elections, they have sought to make up with Delhi in recent years.
    • India has been engaging all the major political formations in Sri Lanka.
    • The stage, then, is ready for a reset in the bilateral relations between the two strong governments in Delhi and Colombo.

China’s movement

  • India is acutely aware that China’s economic and strategic salience in the Subcontinent will continue to grow and is not tied to the regime leadership in its neighbourhood.
    • Delhi can’t expect its neighbours to shut down economic and commercial engagement with Beijing, notwithstanding the many questions about the terms of China’s assistance on projects, including those under the Belt and Road Initiative.
    • But Delhi will be right to ask Colombo not to take steps with Beijing that threaten India’s security.
    • That reset involves addressing the structural factors that have complicated the relationship between Delhi and Colombo.

Develop India-Sri Lanka relationship

  • Delhi and Colombo need a clear understanding of mutual red lines relating to national security and a political comfort level to discuss cases that fall within the orange zone.
    • That should help prevent the recurrence of the controversy over Chinese submarines in Colombo port that generated so much bad blood between the two nations in 2014.
    • As the world rediscovers the geopolitical value of Sri Lanka at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, Colombo has huge opportunities to leverage its location for national benefit.
    • A prudent and important part of that strategy would be to avoid provoking India.
    • Delhi too would be wise to be mindful of Colombo’s security concerns and find ways to develop long-term strategic cooperation with Sri Lanka.

Resolve disputes

  • Delhi needs to invest some political capital in resolving problems such as the long-standing dispute over fisheries.
    • Beyond its objection to China’s BRI projects, Delhi, either alone or in partnership with like-minded countries like Japan, should offer sustainable terms for infrastructure development.
    • Delhi also needs to contribute more to the development of Colombo’s defence and counter-terror capabilities.

Shaping India’s relations with Sri Lanka

  • The structural factor shaping India’s relations with Sri Lanka is the Tamil question.
    • India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s tragic civil war has been far more consequential than the China factor in complicating Delhi’s relations with Colombo.
    • Delhi has certainly learnt the dangers of being drawn too deep into the domestic conflicts of neighbouring countries.

Way ahead

  • The Rajapaksas have declared that they will not bend before foreign pressures.
    • India knows that too much heat from the West will automatically increase China’s leverage in Colombo.
    • If the Tamil question continues to have a big impact on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, Delhi needs to look beyond old formulae to try and encourage reconciliation within Lanka and across the Palk Strait with Tamil Nadu.

Conclusion

  • With a strong government in Sri Lanka, it is time for Delhi to think boldly about its relationship with Colombo.

 

 

Challenges ahead of the PM Shinzo Abe

Relevance: Mains: G.S paper II: International

Context

  • On November 20, Shinzo Abe will become the longest- serving Prime Minister of Japan, overtaking Taro Katsura’s record of 2,886 days in office.

Prime Minister term of Mr. Abe

  • Mr. Abe has been in power for two different spells: a short-lived one, between July 2006 and September 2007, and the current stretch since 2012.
    • Over the last seven years, he has brought stability to a political landscape that had been fractured, honing the image of a strong, conservative leader readying Japan for a newly muscular role in a shifting geopolitical landscape.
    • Mr. Abe has steered the economy out of deflation and decline, if not into growth.
    • He has presided over a significant increase in the country’s military capabilities and attempted to expand Japan’s strategic options beyond its traditional reliance on the United States.

The TINA factor

  • His legacy might not be as long-lasting as his time in office.
    • Critics say the only reason Mr. Abe is still in power is because of a weak and uninspiring Opposition.
    • The TINA (there is no alternative) factor that voters around the world are all too familiar with.

Tenure and performance of Mr. Abe

  • Mr. Abe returned to power in 2012, Japan had been through five Prime Ministers in as many years.
    • His immediate order of business was implementing a set of economic reforms to stimulate the economy, popularly dubbed Abenomics.
    • The three pillars of this stimulus included monetary easing, fiscal spending and deregulation to promote private investment.
    • He also vowed to bring more women into the workforce, an attempt nicknamed “womenomics”.
    • Mr. Abe has reinvented Japan, from a recalcitrant participant in trade liberalisation to a leader of the Trans-Pacific Partnership bloc, after the U.S. withdrew from it in 2017.
    • Under him, Japan has boosted defence spending and enhanced its ability to project power outside of its borders.
    • In a historic shift in 2014, Mr. Abe’s government reinterpreted (without amending) the Constitution to permit Japanese troops to fight overseas for the first time since the Second World War.
    • A five-year defence programme announced in 2018 allocated 25.5 trillion yen ($233.7 billion) in spending, a 6.4% rise over the previous five years.

On the diplomatic front

  • Mr. Abe has reached out to traditional partners like the U.S. (he was the first foreign leader to meet with Donald Trump after the President’s election), while keeping ties with rival China on an even keel.
    • Mr. Abe made an official visit to Beijing last October (the first such visit in nearly seven years) and President Xi Jinping is expected in Japan next year.
    • For Japan, it has been a difficult balancing act, to avoid excessive dependence on the U.S., while anticipating the dangers associated with a more assertive China.
    • Mr. Abe has demonstrated considerable tactical pragmatism in walking this tightrope.
    • Mr. Abe has also reached out to strengthen alliances with regional powers like India and floated the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific for which he has gained the backing, to varying degrees, of the U.S., Australia and India.But, despite this smorgasbord of initiatives,

Criticism

  • Mr. Abe’s tenure has not been entirely rosy.
    • The Japanese economy remains limp and Japanese corporations have so far proved unable to transform themselves into 21st century technology leaders.
    • Though, during his tenure, Japan has benefited from periods of economic growth and low unemployment, the country remains mired in a slow-growth, high-debt deflationary trap.
    • The government recently downgraded its 2019 growth forecast to 0.9% from an earlier prediction of 1.3%.

Moving away from pacifism

  • Domestically, Mr. Abe’s vision of a less pacifist Japan remains deeply contested.
    • His most cherished policy goal is the amendment of Article 9 in the Constitution: the clause that restricts Japan’s ability to maintain a military deterrent.
    • But it is looking no closer to fulfilment than it did at the beginning of his reign. The Prime Minister wants to write the existence of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, as the military is known, into Article 9, giving constitutional standing to de facto reality.
    • However, a survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper earlier this year showed that 64% of respondents opposed even this modest revision.
    • While Mr. Abe continues to reiterate his pledge to push through the revision by 2020, it is looking increasingly unlikely that he will prove successful.

Way ahead

  • Japan can meet the challenge of China’s increasing heft. Relations with neighbour and potential ally, South Korea, are worse than ever.
    • Under Mr. Abe, Japan has made little progress in facing up to its historical responsibility for the widespread atrocities of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Second World War.
    • The recent deterioration in relations with Seoul were prompted by unresolved grievances involving Koreans who were forced to work in Japan’s mines and factories during the war, as well as “comfort women” who were made to service the military’s brothels.
    • Far from helping heal the historical wounds inflicted by Japan, Mr. Abe’s nationalistic stance is seen as unrepentant at best and provocative at worst.

Conclusion

  • Mr. Abe’s long reign will come to an end in September 2021 when his term as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party finishes.
    • At the current juncture it looks as though he will get a pass in the history books, though not with distinction. ‘A’ for longevity, but a ‘B,’ at most, for everything else.

 

 

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